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Abstract
The distribution of health care payments to insurance plans has substantial conse-
quences for social policy. Risk adjustment formulas predict spending in health insur-
ance markets in order to provide fair benefits and health care coverage for all enrollees,
regardless of their health status. Unfortunately, current risk adjustment formulas are
known to underpredict spending for specific groups of enrollees leading to undercom-
pensated payments to health insurers. This incentivizes insurers to design their plans
such that individuals in undercompensated groups will be less likely to enroll, im-
pacting access to health care for these groups. To improve risk adjustment formulas
for undercompensated groups, we expand on concepts from the statistics, computer
science, and health economics literature to develop new fair regression methods for
continuous outcomes by building fairness considerations directly into the objective
function. We additionally propose a novel measure of fairness while asserting that a
suite of metrics is necessary in order to evaluate risk adjustment formulas more fully.
Our data application using the IBM MarketScan Research Databases and simulation
studies demonstrate that these new fair regression methods may lead to massive im-
provements in group fairness (e.g., 98%) with only small reductions in overall fit (e.g.,
4%).
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1. INTRODUCTION
Risk adjustment is a method for correcting payments to health insurers such that they reflect
the cost of their enrollees relative to enrollee health. It is implemented by most federally
regulated health insurance markets in the United States, including Medicare Advantage and
the individual health insurance Marketplaces created by the Affordable Care Act, to prevent
losses to insurers who take on sicker enrollees (Pope et al., 2004, McGuire et al., 2013,
Kautter et al., 2014). Current risk adjustment formulas use ordinary least squares (OLS)
linear regression to predict health plan payments with select demographic information and
diagnosis codes from medical claims. These OLS-based formulas are then typically evaluated
with overall measures of statistical fit, such as R2.
While R2 is an important benchmark for evaluating global fit, it lacks information on
other dimensions. As a result, risk adjustment has been criticized for not incentivizing ef-
ficient payment systems, spending, or population health management (Ash and Ellis, 2012,
Layton et al., 2017), and for poorly estimating health costs for some groups by underpre-
dicting their spending relative to average observed spending in the group. Underpredicting
spending leads to undercompensation to the insurer, and there is evidence that insurers ad-
just the prescription drugs, services, and providers they cover (i.e., benefit design) to make
health plans less attractive for enrollees in undercompensated groups (Shepard, 2016, Carey,
2017, Geruso et al., 2017). Examples of undercompensated groups include enrollees with
specific medical conditions, high-cost enrollees, and partial-year enrollees (van Kleef et al.,
2013, Montz et al., 2016, Ericson et al., 2017). Recent research has also shown that health
plan insurers have the ability to identify undercompensated groups (Jacobs and Sommers,
2015, Geruso et al., 2017, Rose et al., 2017, Withagen-Koster et al., 2018).
What constitutes a fair or unfair algorithm depends heavily on the context. These fair-
ness concepts and methods have been largely developed in the computer science literature
(Chouldechova and Roth, 2018). We will consider risk adjustment formulas unfair if they
underpredict spending for a prespecified group of enrollees, which then incentivizes differen-
tial treatment for the group via benefit design due to this undercompensation. For example,
if average observed spending for individuals with mental health and substance use disorders
(MHSUD) is $10,000, but average predicted spending in this group is $8,000, the risk ad-
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justment formula may be unfair for the MHSUD group by ‘substantially’ underpredicting
their spending. We define formal metrics for evaluating fairness in risk adjustment formulas
using group residual errors in the next section.
Methods for addressing fairness are often separated into three categories based on the
point in the learning process at which fairness is addressed: the preprocessing, fitting, or
postprocessing phase. If the data are inherently biased, then preprocessing techniques are
a possible solution. These methods create fair datasets by transforming or changing the
data so that it is no longer biased (Kamiran and Calders, 2009, Zliobaite et al., 2011, Zemel
et al., 2013, Calmon et al., 2017, Johndrow and Lum, 2017). It has been shown that current
spending patterns among various group may be undesirable due to the plan benefit system,
and by using observed spending data, we reinforce these unfair spending patterns. A recent
study explored this concept by transferring funds to undercompensated groups in the raw
data in order to promote more ideal spending patterns (Bergquist et al., 2019).
One of the most common fitting phase approaches in risk adjustment attempts to fix
group undercompensation by adding new variables representative of the groups in the risk
adjustment formula (van Kleef et al., 2013). While this is a straightforward idea, it can
be problematic if those variables are unavailable, incentivize over- or underutilization of
health services, or the risk adjustment formula does not recognize the improvement (Rose
and McGuire, 2019). Fitting techniques in fairness include separate formulas for protected
classes as well as fairness penalty terms or constraints (Kamishima et al., 2012, Berk et al.,
2017a, Zafar et al., 2017a,b, Bechavod and Ligett, 2018, Dwork et al., 2018). We see inter-
sections of these areas in the risk adjustment literature with separate formulas for enrollees
with MHSUD (Shrestha et al., 2018, van Kleef et al., 2018) and constrained regression to
reduce undercompensation for specific groups (van Kleef et al., 2017). Notably, separate risk
adjustment formulas are already used in practice for infants and adults due to known differ-
ences in spending patterns. Nonparametric statistical machine learning methods to enhance
estimation accuracy in risk adjustment have also been explored for the fitting stage (Rose,
2016, Shrestha et al., 2018, Park and Basu, 2018), but none of these tools are currently
deployed in the U.S. health care system.
Postprocessing techniques modify the results after fitting by, for example, creating specific
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classification thresholds for different groups (Bansal et al., 2014, Hardt et al., 2016, Kleinberg
et al., 2018, El Mhamdi et al., 2018). These methods separate fit from fairness objectives and
allow use of the same prediction function for multiple fairness objectives. Reinsurance, paying
insurers for a portion of the costs of high-cost enrollees, can be considered postprocessing for
risk adjustment in that it reduces undercompensation for high-risk enrollees (McGuire and
van Kleef, 2018).
In this paper, we focus on the fitting phase and expand on concepts from statistics, com-
puter science, and health economics, proposing new estimation methods and measures to
improve risk adjustment formulas for undercompensated groups. We develop two new fair
regression estimators for continuous outcomes that reduce residual errors for an undercom-
pensated group by building fairness considerations directly into the objective function. We
also extend a definition of fairness from the computer science and statistics literature for the
risk adjustment setting while additionally considering existing measures.
Our application features the IBM MarketScan Research Databases. This set of databases
contains enrollee-level claims, demographic information, and health plan spending for a sam-
ple of individuals (and their dependents) insured by private health plans and large employers
across the country. In 2014, the IBM MarketScan Research Databases were used by the fed-
eral government to develop the risk adjustment formula for the individual health insurance
Marketplaces. Thus, this data source is particularly policy relevant. The undercompensated
group we focus on for this data application is enrollees with MHSUD. We select this group
for two major reasons. First, individuals with MHSUD are known to have substantially un-
dercompensated payments in current risk adjustment formulas (Montz et al., 2016). Second,
about 20% of people in the United States have MHSUD, thus it is a priority area for policy
change. Although the data are representative of only a subset of the U.S. health insurance
market, our methods are appropriate for other markets and different application settings
with continuous outcomes. The methods and metrics we present are compared in this data
analysis as well as simulation studies.
2. STATISTICAL FRAMEWORK
This section describes our approach to fair regression. It involves a suite of fairness measures
for evaluating new and existing regression tools in an effort to improve risk adjustment for-
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mulas for undercompensated groups. A typical algorithmic fairness problem has an outcome
Y and input vector X that includes a protected group A ⊂ X. The goal is to create an
estimator for the function f(X) = Y that maps X to Y , while aiming to ensure that the
function is fair for protected group A. Although our main goal is to understand whether
estimation methods beyond OLS, including those we newly propose, improve fairness for risk
adjustment, we also wish to focus on interpretability for stakeholders, such as government
agencies, insurers, providers, and enrollees. Therefore, constrained and penalized regressions
were natural choices to enforce fairness in risk adjustment for undercompensated groups.
2.1 Measures
The most commonly used measures of fairness are based on the notion of group fairness,
striving for similarity in predicted outcomes or errors for groups. Let g be the set containing
all ng enrollees with MHSUD (i.e., the undercompensated group), indexed by i. The com-
plement group, all nc enrollees without MHSUD, is denoted by g
c and indexed by j. Overall
sample size, N = ng + nc, is indexed by k. Group undercompensation is a result of large
average group residuals in the risk adjustment formula. We define fairness as a function of
these residual errors given that many undercompensated groups have substantially higher
average health care costs. Thus, enforcing similar predicted outcomes Yˆ between g and gc
would be unfair to both. In this subsection, we present three relevant existing measures of
group fairness, a new extension of fair covariance modified for group fairness with continuous
outcomes, and R2 as a metric of overall global fit.
Mean Residual Difference. Comparing mean residual errors between a group g and its
complement gc aims to assess fairness by evaluating whether this difference is close to zero
(Calders et al., 2013): 1/ng
∑
i∈g(Yˆi − Yi) − 1/nc
∑
j∈gc(Yˆj − Yj). To date, this metric has
not been applied in risk adjustment.
Net Compensation. Net compensation is a related measure from the health economics
literature on the same scale as the mean residual difference (Layton et al., 2017). However, it
does not contain a term for the mean residual in the complement group: 1/ng
∑
i∈g(Yˆi−Yi).
Therefore, this measure focuses on a reduction in the residuals for g rather than similarity
in residuals between the groups. A parallel net compensation measure can be calculated for
gc.
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We highlight that we intentionally take the difference Yˆi − Yi rather than Yi − Yˆi so that
undercompensation for those in g aligns with a negative value of net compensation, in line
with previous literature (e.g., Bergquist et al., 2019). This is reflected in the mean residual
difference definition above as well. We do not maintain this ordering for the corresponding
estimators in Section 2.2 as we wish to penalize large undercompensation in net compensation
penalized regression by adding to the squared error and the squared term for mean residual
difference penalized regression negates the ordering distinction.
Predictive Ratios. Predictive ratios are commonly used to quantify the underpayment
for specific groups in risk adjustment (Pope et al., 2004):
∑
i∈g Yˆi/
∑
i∈g Yi. Whereas net
compensation provides the absolute magnitude of the loss in dollars, predictive ratios provide
the relative size of the loss. Predictive ratios can also be created for gc.
Fair Covariance. Other fairness work creates a measure based on the idea that to be
fair, the predicted outcome (or residual error) and protected class must be independent.
Using the covariance between the predicted outcome (or residual error) and the protected
class as a proxy for independence, that work establishes a fairness measure (Zafar et al.,
2017a,b). Because this prior metric assumes outcomes are classified into discrete categories,
we extend the definition to define a new measure of fair covariance for residual errors with
continuous Y . Our measure is given by: Cov(A, Y − Yˆ ), where A ∈ {0, 1} is the random
variable indicating membership in g. This measure is bounded by the covariance of the
undercompensated group and the OLS residual, which we refer to as c∗. Our fair covariance
measure allows one to see the empirical signal for systematic undercompensation through
residual covariance and it can also be scaled by c∗ such that it is bounded between 0 and 1.
Global Fit. In addition to fairness measures, we also evaluate overall fit with the tra-
ditional measure used in risk adjustment, which is R2: 1 −∑k(Yk − Yˆk)2/∑k(Yk − Y¯k)2,
where we recall that k indexes the overall sample. Given current policymaker prioritization
of global metrics, it is important to compare estimators with both group and overall fit mea-
sures to understand the impact on global fit when seeking fairness for undercompensated
groups.
The measures we consider above assume that the data include unbiased Y , which may
not be the case in practice. Additionally, fairness is frequently assessed for one or two groups,
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as we also do here. In reality, we are often concerned about fairness for many groups. This
requires the ability to define all meaningful groups, which is not always an objective task.
There are also tradeoffs involved in selecting a fairness metric, and ensuring fairness based
on one definition does not necessarily guarantee a satisfying solution with respect to other
fairness measures or overall fit (Kleinberg et al., 2016, Chouldechova, 2017, Berk et al.,
2017b). We return to these issues in our discussion. In Web Appendix A, we present a new
extension of a fairness measure for comparing individual residual errors rather than mean
residual errors. This Group Residual Difference metric is not practical to implement at scale
in risk adjustment, thus we do not deploy it here, but could be useful for settings where N
is smaller.
2.2 Estimation Methods
We present five methods that incorporate a fairness objective with a constraint or penalty
to improve risk adjustment formulas for undercompensated groups. Two of these methods,
covariance constrained regression and net compensation penalized regression, are new con-
tributions, and all five methods will also be compared to the OLS estimator. We have a
continuous spending outcome Y , a vector of binary health variables H = (H1, . . . , HT ), an
input vector X = {female, age,H}, and a coefficient vector θ indexed by p. For OLS, we
aim to solve the following regression problem:
minimize
θ
{∑
k
(
Yk −
∑
p
θpXkp
)2}
. (1)
Average Constrained Regression. A previously proposed constrained regression method
for risk adjustment requires that the estimated average spending for the undercompensated
group is equal to the average spending, which means that net compensation for the under-
compensated group is zero (van Kleef et al., 2017). This is achieved by including a constraint:
minimizeθ{
∑
k(Yk−
∑
p θpXkp)
2}, subject to 1/ng
∑
i∈g Yi = 1/ng
∑
i∈g(
∑
p θpXip). The given
constraint has been applied in the risk adjustment literature to reduce undercompensation
for select groups (van Kleef et al., 2017, Bergquist et al., 2019).
Weighted Average Constrained Regression. The next existing method relaxes the previous
constraint, allowing the estimated spending to be a weighted average of the average spend-
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ing of the undercompensated group and the estimated spending under unconstrained OLS:
minimizeθ{
∑
k(Yk −
∑
p θpXkp)
2}, subject to 1/ng
∑
i∈g(
∑
p θpXip) = (1 − α)/ng
∑
i∈g Yi +
α/ng
∑
i∈g(
∑
p θ
OLS
p Xip), where θ
OLS is the coefficient vector from the OLS given in for-
mula (1). The hyperparameter α ∈ [0, 1] is a weighting factor. When α = 0, this method
is equivalent to average constrained regression, and when α = 1 it is equivalent to OLS.
Weighted average constrained regression has been shown to reduce undercompensation for
select groups in the Netherlands risk adjustment formula (van Kleef et al., 2017).
Covariance Constrained Regression. The class of covariance methods we consider impose
a constraint on the residual by requiring that the covariance between the residual and the
protected class is close to zero (Zafar et al., 2017a,b). We extend these techniques to propose
a new method for our risk adjustment setting where we have a continuous residual, which
has not been previously explored. In order to solve the optimization problem, we convert it
into a convex problem. We simplify the covariance as follows:
Cov(A, Y − θX) = E[{A− E(A)}{Y − θX − E(Y − θX)}]
= E[{A− E(A)}(Y − θX)]
≈ 1
N
∑
k
[
{Ak − P (A = 1)}
(
Yk −
∑
p
θpXkp
)]
≈ 1
N
[
{1− P (A = 1)}
∑
i∈g
(
Yi −
∑
p
θpXip
)
− P (A = 1)
∑
j∈gc
(
Yj −
∑
p
θpXjp
)]
.
Now that we have the covariance in the form of a convex problem, we can define what we need
to solve: minimizeθ{
∑
k(Yk−
∑
p θpXkp)
2}, subject to {1−P (A = 1)}∑i∈g(Yi−∑p θpXip)−
P (A = 1)
∑
j∈gc(Yj −
∑
p θpXjp) < c and {1 − P (A = 1)}
∑
i∈g(Yi −
∑
p θpXip) − P (A =
1)
∑
j∈gc(Yj −
∑
p θpXjp) ≥ −c. Parallel to the literature for discrete categories (Zafar et al.,
2017b), we set c = m × c∗, where m is a multiplicative factor m ∈ [0, 1] and c∗ is the
covariance of the undercompensated group and the OLS residual. The upper bound for c
occurs at m = 1, which is c∗.
As we are primarily concerned with the residual of the undercompensated group being
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too large, we choose to instead bound the covariance on one side in our implementation of
this method. In other words, we constrain the covariance to be less than some percentage of
the OLS covariance (as defined by the hyperparameter m). A one-sided constraint also yields
faster optimization. The updated optimization problem is: minimizeθ{
∑
k(Yk−
∑
p θpXkp)
2},
subject to {1− P (A = 1)}∑i∈g(Yi −∑p θpXip)− P (A = 1)∑j∈gc(Yj −∑p θpXjp) < c.
Mean Residual Difference Penalized Regression. The relationship between penalized and
constrained regressions is well recognized in statistics (Hastie et al., 2009), and one could
equivalently reformulate the above constraints as penalties. Penalized regression has also
been explored in the fairness literature. Calders et al. (2013) consider constrained formu-
lations of their approaches, but propose the flexibility of penalization as an alternative due
to the possibility of degenerate solutions with a high number of constraints. In their mean
residual difference regression technique, one penalizes with large mean residual differences
between the undercompensated group and the complement group. The coefficients minimize:∑
k(Yk −
∑
p θpXkp)
2 + λ{1/ng
∑
i∈g(Yi −
∑
p θpXip)− 1/nc
∑
j∈gc(Yj −
∑
p θpXjp)}2, where
hyperparameter λ can be user-specified or chosen via cross-validation, and its magnitude
will be on the same scale as Y .
Net Compensation Penalized Regression. In our second new method, rather than im-
posing a constraint, we also formulate a penalized regression. Our regression involves
the inclusion of a custom net compensation penalty term in the minimization problem:∑
k(Yk−
∑
p θpXkp)
2+λ{1/ng
∑
i∈g(Yi−
∑
p θpXip)}. This penalty punishes estimators where
the net compensation, or difference between the average spending and predicted spending
for the undercompensated group, is large. We can alternatively present our new method as
a constraint: minimizeθ{
∑
k(Yk −
∑
p θpXkp)
2}, subject to 1/ng
∑
i∈g(Yi −
∑
p θpXip) ≤ z,
where the hyperparameter z is positive and has a one-to-one correspondence with, but is not
equal to, λ when the constraint is binding. We choose to primarily implement this method as
a penalized regression to explore differences in performance with the mean residual difference
penalized regression for the same values of λ. However, simulation studies in Web Appendix
B of the Supplementary Material examine the performance of the constrained formulation.
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2.3 Computational Implementation
These six methods were evaluated to assess both overall fit and fairness goals with 5-fold
cross-validation in our data analysis and simulations using the suite of five measures de-
fined in Section 2.1. OLS was implemented in the R programming language with the lm()
function. All other estimators were optimized using the CVXR package. This package uses
disciplined convex programming to solve optimization problems and allows users to specify
novel constraints and penalties (Fu et al., 2018).
3. HEALTH CARE SPENDING APPLICATION
We selected a random sample of 100,000 enrollees from the IBM MarketScan Research
Databases. Age, sex, and diagnosed health conditions, all from the year 2015, were used
to predict total annual expenditures in 2016. Diagnosed health conditions took the form
of the established Hierarchical Condition Category (HCC) variables created for risk adjust-
ment. HCCs were developed by the Department of Health and Human Services to group
a selection of International Classification of Disease and Related Health Problems (ICD)
codes into indicators for various health conditions (Pope et al., 2004, Kautter et al., 2014).
We considered the 79 HCC variables currently used in Medicare Advantage risk adjustment
formulas and retained the 62 HCCs that had at least 30 enrollees with the condition. See
Web Appendix C for a list of the 62 HCCs included in the regression formulas. Our sample
of enrollees was 52% female and between the ages of 21 and 63, with median age 45. Mean
and median annual expenditures per enrollee were $6,651 and $1,511, respectively.
We defined enrollees with MHSUD, our protected group A, using Clinical Classification
Software (CCS) categories. This classification system maps each MHSUD-related ICD code
to a CCS category, unlike the HCCs, which only map a subset of MHSUD-related ICD codes.
Based on CCS categories, 13.8% of the sample had a diagnosis code for MHSUD compared
to 2.6% had we used HCCs. We note that we do not capture enrollees with MHSUD who
do not have an ICD code for their condition(s). The mean annual expenditures for MHSUD
enrollees in our sample were $11,520 versus $5,880 for enrollees without MHSUD (and $3,744
versus $1,274 for median annual expeditures).
We compared each method to determine which estimators were best at reducing un-
dercompensation for enrollees with MHSUD, and at what cost to overall statistical fit. In
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Table 1: Performance of Constrained and Penalized Regression Methods
Predictive Net Mean
Ratio Compensation Residual Fair
Method R2 g gc g gc Difference Covariance
Average 12.4% 0.996 1.001 -$46 $4 -$50 6
Covariance 12.4 0.996 1.001 -46 4 -50 6
Net Compensation† 12.5 0.980 1.006 -232 34 -266 31
Weighted Average∓ 12.6 0.964 1.011 -411 62 -473 56
Mean Residual Difference⊕ 12.8 0.895 1.032 -1208 188 -1396 164
OLS 12.9 0.837 1.050 -1872 293 -2165 256
†λ = 10000, ∓α = 0.2, ⊕λ = 30000
Note: Measures calculated based on cross-validated predicted values and sorted on net compensation. Best
performing hyperparameters for each estimator (with respect to fairness measures) are displayed. Perfor-
mance for covariance method was the same for all m. gc is the complement of g.
Table 1, we report the top estimators with respect to fairness for each of the six methods,
having selected the hyperparameter value that optimizes the fairness measures (for those
that have these parameters). Hyperparameter values were user-specified from the range of
plausible values. For example, in the covariance constrained regression, m can range from 0
to 1, and we considered m ∈ {0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8}. Comparisons of global fit versus group fair-
ness for the three methods with variation in performance by hyperparameter can be found
in Figure 1.
OLS had a cross-validated R2 measure of 12.9%, a predictive ratio of 0.837 for individu-
als with MHSUD, and underestimated average MHSUD spending by -$1,872, with a mean
residual difference of -$2,165. The fair covariance measure was 256. Average spending for
enrollees without MHSUD was overestimated by $293 with a predictive ratio of 1.050. OLS
had the worst performance along all fairness metrics while producing an R2 only trivially
higher than the competing methods.
We found the best improvement in fairness for MHSUD using the existing average con-
strained regression and our new covariance constrained regression. These two methods had
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Figure 1: Global Fit versus Group Fairness. Variation in cross-validated performance
by hyperparameter is plotted for three estimators. Predictive ratios for mental health and
substance use disorders (MHSUD) are contrasted with overall R2 fit. Results for all hyper-
parameters in the covariance constrained regression, m ∈ {0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8}, were extremely
similar and thus omitted.
similar, although not identical performance, and reduced the average undercompensation for
enrollees with MHSUD to -$46 (versus -$1,872 in the OLS), a relative improvement of 98%.
They also increased the predictive ratio from 0.837 to 0.996. Enrollees without MHSUD were
overestimated by only $4 and had a predictive ratio of 1.001. Both methods reduced the fair
covariance measure from 256 to 6. Unsurprisingly, these two estimators were also the worst
performers on overall fit as measured by R2, although it was a loss of only 4%, from 12.9%
to 12.4%. This small 0.5 percentage point loss in R2 may be tolerable to policymakers.
Recall that the weighted average constrained regression is a compromise estimator be-
tween the OLS and average constrained regression. As α approached one in the first panel
of Figure 1, the metrics more closely resembled the OLS results. As α approached zero we
saw values closer to the average constrained regression results, although α = 0.2 was not
only dominated by the average constrained and covariance constrained regressions, but also
the net compensation penalized regression with λ = 10000.
The remaining two methods were regressions with customized penalty terms to punish
unfair estimates. Our proposed net compensation penalized regression varied substantially
by hyperparameter (see second panel in Figure 1), although was the third best performer
overall when λ =10000. Large λ values yielded extremely poor performance on both overall
fit and fairness. At λ = 20000, R2 dropped by 12% to 11.9%, and when λ increased to
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30000, R2 dropped to 9%, a relative reduction of 29%. These two λ values led to a large
overcompensation for enrollees with MHSUD. The covariance was also negative, indicating
that the residual value for MHSUD was systematically too high. The mean residual difference
penalized regression was less sensitive to hyperparameters compared to the net compensation
penalized regression (see third panel in Figure 1). The best performance for mean residual
difference penalized regression was at λ = 30000; it improved on the MHSUD predictive
ratio for OLS by 7% (from 0.837 to 0.895) with an R2 loss of less than 1%. However, the
best performing net compensation penalized regression had an 81% improvement over the
best performing mean residual difference penalized regression when comparing MHSUD net
compensation, as well as large improvements in predictive ratios (0.895 versus 0.980) and
fair covariance (164 versus 31).
We also examined the HCC variable coefficients for the best performing estimators, the
average constrained and covariance constrained regressions, in comparison to OLS. Risk ad-
justment coefficients communicate incentives to insurers and providers related to prevention
and care. For example, coefficients that do not reflect costs can impact an insurer’s incentives
in creating their plan offerings. Coefficients for the average constrained and covariance con-
strained regressions were nearly identical when rounded to the nearest whole dollar, thus we
display OLS versus covariance constrained regression in Figure 2. We considered the largest
five increases and largest five decreases from OLS to covariance constrained regression, and
observed sizable increases in the estimated coefficients associated with MHSUD. The largest
relative increase was 180% for “Schizophrenia.” Relative decreases were much smaller.
4. SIMULATION STUDY
A set of simulation scenarios was developed to explore how these regression methods perform
in other settings. We generated a population of 100,000 observations with two continuous
outcomes Y1 and Y2 that were each a function of covariates in X = (X1, X2, ..., X9) and two
distinct yet partially overlapping protected classes (A1 and A2) that depended on variables
in X. Scenario 1 considered a complex functional form for Y1 and regression estimators
that were misspecified, including omitted X variables. Scenario 2 examined a less complex
functional form in Y2 and regression estimators that were misspecified, including additional
noise variables but no omitted X variables. A third scenario is discussed in Web Appendix
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Figure 2: Largest Coefficient Changes. Increases in coefficient values from the OLS to
covariance constrained regression are represented by solid lines with decreases in dashed lines.
Largest five increases and largest five decreases were considered; “Chronic Kidney Disease,
Severe (Stage 4)” and “Severe Hematological Disorders” (both decreases) were suppressed
due to large magnitudes while having small relative percentage changes of <1%
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Figure 3: Simulation Results. The plot includes OLS and estimation methods that im-
proved fairness measures with a relative cross-validated R2 loss ≤ 10% for N = 10, 000.
Predictive ratios for protected class A1 are contrasted with overall R
2 fit.
B of the Supplementary Material, along with complete details for the simulated population
and first two scenarios. For each scenario, we drew 500 samples of N =1,000 and N =10,000
observations from the simulated population of 100,000 observations. As in the data analysis,
hyperparameter values were user-specified from the range of plausible values.
Selected results are presented in Figure 3, which includes OLS and those methods that
improved fairness measures for protected class A1 with a relative R
2 loss ≤ 10%. Notably, av-
erage constrained and covariance constrained regression, the tied top estimators in our data
analysis, do not appear. This was common across settings; average constrained and covari-
ance constrained regression often struggled with functional form misspecification. However,
net compensation penalized regression, which performed well in our data analysis, also per-
formed well in the simulations with respect to achieving metric balance between global fit
decreases and group fit increases. Additional results are available in Web Appendix B of the
Supplementary Material.
5. DISCUSSION
We proposed new fair regression methods aiming to improve risk adjustment for undercom-
pensated groups and asserted that a broader set of metrics is needed. As expected, there
was no single method that performed the best across all the measures. One of our newly
proposed techniques, net compensation penalized regression, had strong performance with
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respect to fairness and global fit in both the data analysis and simulations. Selecting the
‘best’ method relies on subjective decisions regarding how to balance group fairness ver-
sus overall fit tradeoffs. Improvements in fairness resulted in subsequent decreases in R2.
However, for many estimators, particularly in our data analysis, improvements in fairness
were larger than the subsequent decreases in overall fit. This suggests that if we allow for a
slight drop in overall fit, we could greatly increase compensation for MHSUD. Policymakers
need to consider whether they are willing to sacrifice small reductions in global fit for large
improvements in fairness.
We used a sample of enrollees in our demonstration. At scale in a policy implementation,
data from millions of enrollees would be used to estimate health spending. Solutions to
group undercompensation must be scalable, and current software may or may not yet be
capable of handling the sample sizes required. We tested the CVXR optimization package
on larger samples and found that it was able to find solutions on a sample of 1,000,000
observations over the span of 3 days (versus 7 hours for the 100,000 enrollee sample). While
the optimization results were not within the ideal optimal threshold, they still converged
and the results were similar to those presented in this paper, which is promising. Future
work includes additional studies regarding scalability. In our analyses, we also considered a
selection of user-specified hyperparameter values. A more thorough approach, with possibly
improved results, would explore the hyperparameter space in an automated way to select
values that optimize over joint fairness and fit objectives. As a general guideline, we found
that λ = N/10 yielded reasonable metric balance for our newly proposed net compensation
penalized regression.
We focused on one group that risk adjustment is known to disadvantage, but it is im-
portant to extend such strategies to multiple groups. Improvements for one group could
result in subsequent undercompensation for other groups, and balancing fairness across an
increasing number of groups is an as yet unsolved problem in risk adjustment. Our simula-
tions examined two protected classes, and we found that improving fairness for one group
did not generally help or harm the second group. Earlier research developing methods for
the preprocessing phase found that reducing undercompensation for enrollees with MHSUD
improved fairness measures for other groups, including enrollees with multiple chronic condi-
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tions but without MHSUD. Among the groups included in their comparisons, only enrollees
with heart disease had slight reductions in fairness (Bergquist et al., 2019). But even the act
of defining the groups poses a problem, as this can be subjective, potentially favoring larger
groups with well-funded advocacy organizations. Undercompensation could be undetected
in many other lesser-known groups. However, we can only measure undercompensation for
groups that are identified by available data, and socioeconomic information, such as poverty
and housing, are not available at the individual level for risk adjustment (Ellis et al., 2018).
Broadly, data-driven decisions have come under scrutiny for perpetuating human biases
and disparities, which certainly exists in risk adjustment. Arguments for a more comprehen-
sive view of research results is increasing among scientific researchers today (O’Neil, 2017,
Gibney, 2018). Recent work argues that evaluating methods from a purely statistical stand-
point can lead to negative consequences, and that policy aims should be better incorporated
into our research (Corbett-Davies and Goel, 2018). Our article follows in this spirit, and we
presented additional estimators and comparisons across multiple measures for the numerous
(sometimes competing) goals of risk adjustment. While we worked within the specific context
of risk adjustment, the fairness methods and measures discussed here have implications for
other settings with continuous outcomes, which have been understudied relative to binary
outcomes.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS
Web Appendix A presents the Group Residual Difference, a new extension of a fairness mea-
sure for comparing individual residual errors that is not currently practical to implement at
scale in risk adjustment. Web Appendix B, referenced in Sections 2 and 4, describes the
simulation study details and results. Web Appendix C is a list of HCCs included in the
data analysis regression formulas from Section 3. The IBM MarketScan Research Databases
used in Section 3 are not available for public dissemination as they contain protected patient
information and we were granted access via a restricted data use agreement. Instead, we gen-
erated a simulated version of the analysis data that preserves important relationships while
protecting the original content, as described in Web Appendix D. We provide this simulated
analysis data with code as well as code to reproduce the simulation study from Section 4
with this submission and online: https://github.com/zinka88/Fair-Regression.
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WEB APPENDIX A: GROUP RESIDUAL DIFFERENCE
Group Residual Difference. In the fairness literature, one definition for continuous outcomes
is that persons with similar Y should have similar predicted outcomes Yˆ regardless of their
protected class (Berk et al., 2017a). This relies on a user-defined distance function d, such
as |Yi − Yj|, to ensure that people who are ‘close’ have similar outcomes. We extend this
definition for risk adjustment by comparing residuals rather than predicted outcomes for the
two groups: [1/(ngnc)
∑
i∈g,j∈gc d(Yi, Yj){Yi− Yˆi− (Yj− Yˆj)}]2. We refer to this new measure
as the group residual difference. However, this measure is not practical to implement at scale
in risk adjustment, which often involves millions of enrollees. The group residual difference
requires comparing the residual of every enrollee in the undercompensated group to every
other enrollee in the complement group. This scaling issue was also noted in the earlier work
our metric extends upon (Berk et al., 2017a). Our group residual difference metric can be
useful in settings where N is smaller.
19
WEB APPENDIX B: SIMULATION STUDY DETAILS
As described in Section 4 of the main text, our simulation study population of 100,000 obser-
vations considered covariates X = (X1, X2, ..., X9), two protected class indicator variables
(A1 and A2), and two continuous outcome variables (Y1 and Y2). X1 was generated from a
Normal distribution with mean 70 and standard deviation 15. Both X2 and X3 had Pois-
son distributions, with λ values of 10 and 35, respectively. The last six covariates (X4:9)
were drawn from Bernoulli distributions with probabilities 0.5, 0.1, 0.05, 0.8, 0.03, and 0.2.
A1 and A2 were also drawn from Bernoulli distributions, but depended on other generated
variables in the population:
A1 ∼ Bernoulli(X4 ×X9/2 + .01)
A2 ∼ Bernoulli(X24/3 + .05).
They had prevalence rates of 6% and 22%, respectively, with 2.1% overlap. Both outcomes,
Y1 and Y2, depended on variables in X as well as A1 and A2:
Y1 = (X1 ×X2 ×X4) + (A1 ×X2 ×X7) + (X3 ×X5 ×X6) + 2(X8×X9)
+ (A1 ×X1 ×X5) + (A2 ×X3 ×X5)
Y2 = X1 +X2 + (X3 ×X4 ×X5) + (A1 ×X3) + (A1 × A2 ×X1).
We estimated regressions in three scenarios representing differing types of functional form
misspecification:
Scenario 1: Y1 = β1X1 + β2X2 + β3X3 + β4X5 + β5X6 + β6X7 + β7X8 + β8X9
Scenario 2: Y2 = γ1X1 + γ2X2 + γ3X3 + γ4X4 + γ5X5 + γ6X6 + γ7X7 + γ8X8 + γ9X9
Scenario 3: Y2 = ζ1X1 + ζ2X4 + ζ3X6 + ζ4X7 + ζ5X8 + ζ6X9.
Complete results for 500 draws from the population with N = 1, 000 and N = 10, 000 are
given in Web Tables 1 and 2. Simulation data and complete analytic code to reproduce the
simulation analyses are available online: https://github.com/zinka88/Fair-Regression.
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Web Table 1: Simulation Results, N=1,000
Predictive Net
Ratio Compensation Fair
Scenario Method R2 g1 g1 g2 Covariance
1 Net Compensation, λ = 5000 -2901.0 5.96 3231 -273 -198.6
Net Compensation, λ = 1000 -106.9 1.63 408 -270 -25.0
Average -8.8 0.98 -15 -270 0.9
Covariance, m = 0.2 -8.8 0.98 -15 -270 0.9
Mean Residual Difference, λ = 5000 -7.0 0.96 -28 -270 1.7
Mean Residual Difference, λ = 1000 -2.0 0.89 -70 -270 4.3
Weighted Average, α = 0.2 -1.9 0.89 -71 -270 4.4
Net Compensation Constraint, z = 0.2 0.1 0.86 -92 -270 5.7
Weighted Average, α = 0.4 3.5 0.80 -128 -269 7.9
Weighted Average, α = 0.6 7.3 0.72 -185 -269 11.4
Mean Residual Difference, λ = 100 8.7 0.67 -215 -269 13.2
Net Compensation, λ = 100 9.1 0.65 -227 -269 14.0
Weighted Average, α = 0.8 9.6 0.63 -241 -269 14.9
Net Compensation Constraint, α = 0.6 9.6 0.62 -245 -269 15.1
Net Compensation Constraint, z = 1 10.4 0.54 -298 -269 18.3
OLS 10.4 0.54 -298 -269 18.4
2 Net Compensation, λ = 5000 -3436.9 2.53 217 43 -13.3
Net Compensation, λ = 1000 -85.7 1.07 9 5 -0.6
Average -33.5 0.99 -1 3 0.1
Covariance, m = 0.2 -33.4 0.99 -1 3 0.1
Mean Residual Difference, λ = 5000 -26.5 0.98 -3 3 0.2
Net Compensation Constraint, z = 0.2 -14.3 0.96 -6 3 0.4
Mean Residual Difference, λ = 1000 -5.6 0.94 -8 2 0.5
Weighted Average, α = 0.2 -1.5 0.93 -10 2 0.6
Net Compensation Constraint, α = 0.6 17.2 0.89 -16 1 1.0
Weighted Average, α = 0.4 23.5 0.87 -18 0 1.1
Net Compensation Constraint, z = 1 39.3 0.82 -25 -1 1.5
Weighted Average, α = 0.6 41.3 0.82 -26 -1 1.6
Mean Residual Difference, λ = 100 45.9 0.80 -29 -2 1.8
Weighted Average, α = 0.8 52.2 0.76 -34 -3 2.1
Net Compensation, λ = 100 54.4 0.74 -37 -3 2.3
OLS 56.0 0.70 -43 -4 2.6
3 Net Compensation, λ = 5000 -726.2 1.00 1 44 0.0
Average -582.7 0.97 -5 39 0.3
Covariance, m = 0.2 -582.4 0.97 -5 39 0.3
Net Compensation Constraint, z = 0.2 -472.3 0.94 -9 35 0.6
Mean Residual Difference, λ = 5000 -395.8 0.91 -12 32 0.8
Weighted Average, α = 0.2 -358.0 0.90 -14 31 0.9
Net Compensation Constraint, α = 0.6 -283.7 0.87 -18 27 1.1
Weighted Average, α = 0.4 -183.0 0.83 -24 22 1.5
Net Compensation Constraint, z = 1 -138.0 0.81 -27 19 1.6
Mean Residual Difference, λ = 100 -121.7 0.80 -28 18 1.7
Weighted Average, α = 0.6 -57.7 0.77 -33 13 2.0
Net Compensation, λ = 1000 12.0 0.71 -42 6 2.6
Weighted Average, α = 0.8 18.0 0.70 -43 5 2.6
Mean Residual Difference, λ = 100 37.5 0.66 -48 0 2.9
Net Compensation, λ = 100 43.5 0.64 -51 -3 3.1
OLS 44.0 0.63 -52 -4 3.2
Note: Measures calculated based on cross-validated predicted values and sorted on net compensation. Estimators with negative
R2 values are in shaded text.
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Web Table 2: Simulation Results, N=10,000
Predictive Net
Ratio Compensation Fair
Scenario Method R2 g1 g1 g2 Covariance
1 Net Compensation, λ = 5000 -15.9 1.08 51 -271 -3.1
Average -8.4 1.00 -1 -271 0.1
Covariance, m = 0.2 -8.4 1.00 -1 -271 0.1
Weighted Average, α = 0.2 -1.3 0.90 -60 -271 3.7
Net Compensation Constraint, z = 0.2 0.8 0.88 -81 -271 5.0
Mean Residual Difference, λ = 5000 2.6 0.85 -101 -271 6.2
Weighted Average, α = 0.4 4.2 0.82 -120 -271 7.3
Weighted Average, α = 0.6 8.2 0.73 -179 -271 10.9
Mean Residual Difference, λ = 1000 9.8 0.67 -213 -271 13.1
Net Compensation, λ = 1000 10.2 0.65 -227 -271 13.9
Weighted Average, α = 0.8 10.5 0.64 -238 -271 14.6
Net Compensation Constraint, z = 0.6 10.6 0.63 -241 -271 14.8
Mean Residual Difference, λ = 100 11.3 0.56 -286 -271 17.5
Net Compensation, λ = 100 11.3 0.56 -290 -271 17.7
Net Compensation Constraint, z = 1 11.3 0.55 -297 -271 18.2
OLS 11.3 0.55 -297 -271 18.2
2 Average -31.2 1.00 0 3 0.0
Covariance, m = .2 -31.2 1.00 0 3 0.0
Net Compensation Constraint, λ = 0.2 -12.2 0.97 -5 3 0.3
Weighted Average, α = 0.2 0.4 0.94 -9 2 0.5
Mean Residual Difference, λ = 5000 12.3 0.91 -12 1 0.8
Net Compensation Constraint, z = 0.6 18.8 0.90 -15 1 0.9
Net Compensation, λ = 5000 22.6 0.89 -16 1 1.0
Weighted Average, α = 0.4 25.0 0.88 -17 0 1.1
Net Compensation Constraint, z = 1 40.6 0.83 -24 -1 1.5
Weighted Average, α = 0.6 42.6 0.82 -26 -1 1.6
Mean Residual Difference, λ = 1000 47.1 0.80 -29 -2 1.8
Weighted Average, α = 0.8 53.1 0.76 -34 -3 2.1
Net Compensation, λ = 1000 55.3 0.74 -37 -3 2.3
Mean Residual Difference, λ = 100 56.4 0.72 -41 -4 2.5
Net Compensation, λ = 100 56.6 0.71 -42 -4 2.6
OLS 56.6 0.70 -43 -4 2.6
3 Average -637.6 1.00 -1 44 0.0
Covariance, m = .2 -637.5 1.00 -1 44 0.0
Net Compensation Constraint, z = 0.2 -517.1 0.96 -5 40 0.3
Weighted Average, α = 0.2 -392.3 0.92 -11 34 0.7
Net Compensation Constraint, z = 0.6 -311.2 0.89 -15 31 0.9
Weighted Average, α = 0.4 -201.5 0.85 -21 25 1.3
Net Compensation Constraint, z = 1 -152.2 0.83 -25 22 1.5
Weighted Average, α = 0.6 -65.1 0.78 -32 15 2.0
Mean Residual Difference, λ = 5000 -28.7 0.75 -36 12 2.2
Weighted Average, α = 0.8 16.7 0.70 -42 5 2.6
Net Compensation, λ = 5000 37.3 0.67 -47 1 2.9
Mean Residual Difference, λ = 1000 38.7 0.66 -48 0 3.0
Net Compensation, λ = 1000 43.8 0.64 -52 -3 3.2
Mean Residual Difference, λ = 100 44.0 0.63 -52 -4 3.2
Net Compensation, λ = 100 44.1 0.63 -53 -4 3.2
OLS 44.1 0.63 -53 -4 3.2
Note: Measures calculated based on cross-validated predicted values and sorted on net compensation. Estimators with negative
R2 values are in shaded text.
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WEB APPENDIX C: HIERARCHICAL CONDITION CATEGORY (HCC) VARIABLES
HCC Description
1 HIV/AIDS
2 Septicemia, Sepsis, Systemic Inflammatory Response Syndrome/Shock
6 Opportunistic Infections
8 Metastatic Cancer and Acute Leukemia
9 Lung and Other Severe Cancers
10 Lymphoma and Other Cancers
11 Colorectal, Bladder, and Other Cancers
12 Breast, Prostate, and Other Cancers and Tumors
17 Diabetes with Acute Complications
18 Diabetes with Chronic Complications
19 Diabetes without Complication
21 Protein-Calorie Malnutrition
22 Morbid Obesity
23 Other Significant Endocrine and Metabolic Disorders
27 End-Stage Liver Disease
28 Cirrhosis of Liver
29 Chronic Hepatitis
33 Intestinal Obstruction/Perforation
34 Chronic Pancreatitis
35 Inflammatory Bowel Disease
39 Bone/Joint/Muscle Infections/Necrosis
40 Rheumatoid Arthritis and Inflammatory Connective Tissue Disease
46 Severe Hematological Disorders
47 Disorders of Immunity
48 Coagulation Defects and Other Specified Hematological Disorders
54 Drug/Alcohol Psychosis
55 Drug/Alcohol Dependence
57 Schizophrenia
58 Major Depressive, Bipolar, and Paranoid Disorders
72 Spinal Cord Disorders/Injuries
75 Myasthenia Gravis/Myoneural Disorders, Inflammatory and Toxic Neuropathy
77 Multiple Sclerosis
78 Parkinson’s and Huntington’s Diseases
79 Seizure Disorders and Convulsions
80 Coma, Brain Compression/Anoxic Damage
84 Cardio-Respiratory Failure and Shock
85 Congestive Heart Failure
86 Acute Myocardial Infarction
87 Unstable Angina and Other Acute Ischemic Heart Disease
88 Angina Pectoris
96 Specified Heart Arrhythmias
99 Cerebral Hemorrhage
100 Ischemic or Unspecified Stroke
103 Hemiplegia/Hemiparesis
107 Vascular Disease with Complications
108 Vascular Disease
111 Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease
112 Fibrosis of Lung and Other Chronic Lung Disorders
114 Aspiration and Specified Bacterial Pneumonias
122 Proliferative Diabetic Retinopathy and Vitreous Hemorrhage
134 Dialysis Status
135 Acute Renal Failure
136 Chronic Kidney Disease, Stage 5
137 Chronic Kidney Disease, Severe (Stage 4)
161 Chronic Ulcer of Skin, Except Pressure
167 Major Head Injury
169 Vertebral Fractures without Spinal Cord Injury
170 Hip Fracture/Dislocation
173 Traumatic Amputations and Complications
176 Complications of Specified Implanted Device or Graft
186 Major Organ Transplant or Replacement Status
188 Artificial Openings for Feeding or Elimination
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WEB APPENDIX D: SIMULATED ANALYSIS DATA
The IBM MarketScan Research Databases analyzed in Section 3 of the manuscript cannot
be distributed online due to their proprietary nature. They also contain protected patient
information. Thus, we created a simulated data set with similar properties using key fea-
tures and relationships from the original data for reproducibility analyses of our code. The
simulated analysis data described below and accompanying code to complete the analyses
are available online: https://github.com/zinka88/Fair-Regression.
First, we simulated demographic variables, female and age, by sampling from a Bernoulli
distribution, female ∼ Bernoulli(0.52), and truncated Normal distribution with lower bound
a and upper bound b: age ∼ Normal(44, 12, a = 21, b = 63). Next, we generated the 62
binary health variables H = (H1, ..., HT ), each drawn from a Bernoulli distribution and
dependent on the demographic variables female and age with coefficients determined by the
relationships in the original data. To create the indicator for MHSUD, A, we generated 15
binary MHSUD CCS variables C = (C1, ..., C15) dependent on age, female, and the top six
HCCs correlated with MHSUD in the original data. We defined A = 1 for all observations
with at least one MHSUD CCS; 15.7% of observations in the simulated analysis data had
MHSUD compared to 13.8% in the original data.
To generate Y , we added random noise to an intermediary outcome Y¨ dependent on the
input vector X = {female, age,H ,C}. We note that while C was used to generate Y¨ , it is
not used later in the estimation steps as this information is not currently included in risk
adjustment formulas. Y¨ was determined using a 2-part model. First, to capture the 10.5%
of observations without spending in the original data, we generated whether any spending
occurred by creating a binary variable S with S ∼ Bernoulli(pS), where pS = logit−1[ΩX]
and Ω is a vector of coefficients based on the original data. Next, for observations with
positive spending, we generated the amount of spending that occurred using a log-linear
model of spending dependent on X to account for the right-skew of the spending outcome:
Y¨ =
0, if S = 0eΦX , if S = 1,
where Φ is a vector of coefficients based on the original data. Lastly, we sampled from
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Web Table 3: Performance of Constrained and Penalized Regression Methods in Simulated
Data
Predictive Net Mean
Ratio Compensation Residual Fair
Method R2 g gc g gc Difference Covariance
Net Compensation† 18.5% 1.001 1.000 $6 -$1 $7 -1
Average 18.6 0.999 1.000 -5 1 -7 1
Covariance 18.6 0.999 1.000 -5 1 -7 1
Weighted Average∓ 19.0 0.984 1.004 -106 20 -127 17
Mean Residual Difference⊕ 19.6 0.947 1.012 -364 68 -432 57
OLS 19.7 0.925 1.017 -512 95 -607 80
†λ = 20000, ∓α = 0.2, ⊕λ = 30000
Note: Measures calculated based on cross-validated predicted values and sorted on net compensation. Best performing hyper-
parameters for each estimator (with respect to fairness measures) are displayed. Performance for covariance method was the
same for all m. gc is the complement of g.
a truncated normal centered around each observation in Y¨ to add noise to the generated
outcome: Yk ∼ Normal(Y¨k, 6000, a = 0, b = max(Y )), where Yk is the predicted outcome for
observation k in the simulated data. The final simulated spending outcome ranged from $0
to $297,206 with a mean of $5,817 and median of $4,881. The average spending for enrollees
with MHSUD was $6,812 versus $5,632 for enrollees without MHSUD. R2 under OLS was
19.7%.
The results from the simulated analysis data are shown in Web Table 3. As demonstrated
in our data analysis presented in Section 3 of the main text, we likewise find that the con-
strained and penalized estimation methods improve fairness measures without a significant
decrease in R2. The relative rankings of all the methods are similar, although we highlight
that net compensation penalized regression performs even more similarly to average con-
strained and covariance constrained regression methods here.
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